
The never-ending battle for the heart and soul of America
Simon J Evenett explores 250 years of contested American identity, and explains why tracking these deep philosophical battles is crucial for managing corporate risk...

by José Caballero Published April 20, 2026 in Geopolitics • 6 min read
As the geopolitical center of gravity shifts and middle powers gain strategic weight, their influence will hinge less on ambition than on execution. Yet, their ability to translate global opportunities into lasting prosperity will depend on whether they can address long‑standing weaknesses at home.
One such economy defies easy narratives. Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and home to world-class firms, deep capital markets, and a scientific output that outperforms regional peers by a considerable margin. In the IMD Latin America and Caribbean Prosperity Rating 2026 report, however, the country, which has an overall B1 rating, achieves a middle-tier outcome. This is a solid but unremarkable result that, when you consider its scale and productive capacity, places it well below its capability.
Understanding why requires looking beyond any single factor. The answer lies in a structural condition that the report calls “cross-pillar misalignment.” It is a paradox in which exceptional strengths in one domain coexist with severe weaknesses in others, which in turn prevent the former from reaching their full potential.
The report measures 78 data points across four areas: Economic Challenges, Governance & Institutions, Managerial Dynamics, and Societal Empowerment.
Brazil’s situation inhibits any single one of these leading to sustained prosperity. For business executives operating in or considering Brazil, this misalignment is not an abstract analytical finding, but the central strategic reality of the market.
Brazil's flailing governance and institutions place it among the weakest institutional performers in the entire region, according to the report.
Brazil ranks first among 34 countries in the entire LAC region when it comes to the total size of its labor force, its R&D expenditure as a share of GDP, and its total number of scientific articles published in journals, books, and conferences. This is an exceptional foundation for knowledge-intensive growth.
It ranks second in the number of listed domestic companies (with 331 of its firms on public markets) and achieves one of the region’s strongest scores in stock market capitalization. Its managerial dynamics are one of the two strongest in the region. Its productive capacity, financial depth, and business sophistication are of a caliber that few regional peers can match. Moreover, they are not marginal advantages; they represent decades of institutional investment in productive capabilities and a private sector that has developed genuine global competitiveness in sectors ranging from agribusiness to fintech.
Conversely, Brazil’s flailing governance and institutions place it among the weakest institutional performers in the entire region, according to the report. Government budget surplus is at -8.4% of GDP, and total general government debt stands at 91.4% of GDP; both are among the highest regionally. Interest payments consume 30.8% of government revenue, which leaves limited fiscal space for productive investment.
The report’s rule of law index score (0.5) places Brazil at 16th. Although corruption levels appear moderate (16th) at the regional level, they remain higher than what Brazil’s income level would predict. These are not small cracks on the surface. They are structural fault lines in an institutional environment that consistently undermines the conditions needed to convert economic potential into broad-based prosperity.
The strengths that drive Brazil's managerial dynamism are real but narrowly concentrated, and the governance deficits that underpin its weak governance and institutional rating affect the entire economy.
It is tempting to treat Brazil’s governance weakness as a known and manageable cost of doing business. That is, a discount may already be priced into investment decisions. The report suggests that such an approach is insufficient. “Cross-pillar misalignment,” as the report terms Brazil’s status quo, does not simply add risk to individual transactions. It creates a structural ceiling on aggregate outcomes that shapes the operating environment for all firms, regardless of their sector or size.
Consider what this means in practice. Brazil’s stellar managerial dynamics are driven partly by a relatively small number of large, sophisticated firms concentrated in finance, agribusiness, energy, and technology. The broader productivity landscape, however, remains deeply heterogeneous. SMEs, which account for over half of formal employment in Brazil, operate with significantly lower productivity, limited managerial capabilities, and constrained access to long-term finance. This highlights persistent structural constraints in firm organization and credit access. The same financial system that supports deep capital markets charges substantially higher borrowing costs to smaller firms, with lending rates for SMEs reaching more than double those of large corporations.
The same institutional environment that enables Brazil’s scientific excellence fails to translate that knowledge into broad-based innovation diffusion. In other words, the strengths that drive Brazil’s managerial dynamism are real but narrowly concentrated, and the governance deficits that underpin its weak governance and institutional rating affect the entire economy.
For executives, such an environment carries two major implications.
Brazil’s societal empowerment performance in the rating captures this. Despite a relatively moderate Human Development Iindex score and strong internet infrastructure, socioeconomic inequality remains among the worst in the region, with a Gini coefficient of 51.6. In addition, women hold 17.5% of parliamentary seats, among the lowest regionally. Brazil also shows a weak performance in the gender inequality index. These are not peripheral social concerns. They are constraints on the size and quality of the labor force, the depth of domestic demand, and the long-term sustainability of growth.
The report offers executives a reframing tool rather than a simple set
of risk scores.
The report offers executives a reframing tool rather than a simple set of risk scores. Brazil’s cross-pillar misalignment means that strategic assessments should move beyond sector-level analysis and consider how institutional, managerial, and societal dimensions interact within specific operating contexts. A market-entry strategy that performs well under stable governance assumptions may prove fragile when fiscal pressure intensifies, regulatory environments shift, or social inequality generates political volatility.
Whether Brazil’s strengths endure – its capital markets, scientific base, and productive sophistication in leading sectors, for example – largely depends on whether governance and institutional conditions improve over time. Without fiscal consolidation, strengthening the rule of law, and broader social inclusion, the structural ceiling identified by its prosperity results will persist. Brazil’s exceptional productive capabilities will continue to coexist with institutional fragility, generating the same paradox it is experiencing today, reflected in its middle-tier overall prosperity outcome.
For executives, the strategic implication is clear. Brazil rewards those who understand its structural incongruities, where its genuine strengths lie, where institutional costs accumulate, and why the distance between the two defines the real risk landscape of one of the world’s most consequential emerging markets.

Senior Economist at the IMD World Competitiveness Center
José Caballero leads the IMD World Competitiveness Center’s research team in the development and implementation of new models of assessing competitiveness. His research interests focus on the sources of the competitiveness of countries and, more specifically, on the competitiveness of enterprises. He is also an expert on the political economy of Latin America.

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