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by Hans-Christoph Hirt, Tom Gosling Published November 19, 2026 in Sustainability • 11 min read
For much of the past decade, corporate leaders have seen an investor climate agenda moving in only one direction: ever-rising expectations to set net-zero goals and publish 1.5°C-aligned transition plans.
The high point came around COP26 in Glasgow in 2021. Net-zero commitments proliferated, and the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) and related initiatives, such as the Net Zero Asset Managers initiative (NZAM), created a sense that large parts of global finance were aligning behind the transition. Many investors, policymakers, and companies spoke as if capital markets could help lead the economy toward decarbonization by demanding better disclosure, setting portfolio targets, allocating capital differently, and engaging more assertively with boards.
That period has given way to a more sober phase. In a recent London School of Economics (LSE) research project, we held five workshops with more than 60 senior representatives of asset owners and asset managers in New York, Amsterdam, London, and Singapore, representing approximately $40–50tn in assets.
Most participants continued to regard climate change as financially material, particularly over longer time horizons, and wanted to support the transition. However, they were increasingly conscious of the limits of investor influence.
The discussions also suggest that companies have received mixed signals from investors: stewardship and sustainability teams pressed for ambition, disclosure, and alignment, while portfolio managers and analysts continued to test capital allocation, cash flows, competitiveness, and returns. A further tension lies between asset owners concerned about long-term, system-level climate risks and asset managers whose mandates and performance incentives may give greater weight to shorter-term investment outcomes.
Climate change is competing for investor and management attention with energy security, geopolitics, and the rise of AI, while inflation and higher interest rates have brought transition costs into sharper focus. In the US, investor climate action has become politically and legally contested.
The result is a reset in investor climate thinking, with important implications for companies.
The investor climate agenda of the early 2020s rested on a superficially compelling but ultimately flawed proposition: investors, acting individually and collectively, could use capital markets and shareholder influence to accelerate decarbonization. They could direct capital toward climate solutions, tilt portfolios away from high-emitting assets, press companies for better climate disclosure, net-zero targets, and transition plans, and, where necessary, escalate pressure through voting on transition plans and directors. They could also align investment portfolios with net-zero pathways.
This approach contributed to changes at companies. Climate risk moved into boardrooms. Disclosure improved. Many companies set emissions targets, published transition plans, and began building internal climate capabilities. Investor coalitions helped create common expectations and put climate change on the agenda of companies that might otherwise have moved more slowly.
Yet the market-led story overstated what investors could achieve. Investors cannot bring about economy-wide decarbonization, company by company, if the incentives those companies face point in a different direction. In sectors where demand remains robust, low-carbon technologies are not yet competitive, infrastructure is missing, or policy is inconsistent, investor pressure or portfolio reallocation alone cannot make the transition commercially viable.
Investors can influence corporate behavior by promoting disclosure, better governance, and risk management, and by encouraging companies to explore commercially viable opportunities. They can also make clear that climate change is financially material for their portfolios. But they cannot, on a sustained basis, force companies to pursue strategies that boards and management judge to be commercially damaging. The limits are visible in four areas:
First, portfolio decarbonization metrics can create the illusion of progress. A portfolio can lower reported financed emissions by simply selling high-emitting assets to someone else, which may well improve the numbers without reducing emissions.
Second, company-level transition plans can become detached from policy and technology. A plan may look aligned with a pathway but still depend on assumptions about carbon prices, subsidies, infrastructure, customer demand, and technologies not yet visible in the market.
Third, investor engagement can become overextended. Engagement with companies works best when it addresses issues that are within the realistic discretion of directors and management. It becomes less credible when investors ask companies to take actions that would materially damage competitiveness or value without a plausible route to offsetting benefits.
Fourth, capital allocation also has limits. Capital can support commercially viable climate solutions and resilience, and in some areas, investors can play a catalytic role. But capital cannot by itself make uneconomic activities investable.
The old market-led framing helped mobilize attention. The next phase requires a more disciplined view of what investors can actually do.
Investors cannot force companies to pursue strategies that boards judge to be commercially damaging.
A policy-led transition does not leave investors on the sidelines but places their role in a more realistic sequence.
Government policy and technology development are the primary determinants of decarbonization pathways. Policy shapes incentives through prices, permits, infrastructure, standards, subsidies, and demand. Technology determines what is feasible, scalable, and affordable. Together, they define what companies can do while remaining competitive and financially viable. Investors operate within that boundary, and they can still influence it.
Where climate change is financially material to their beneficiaries or clients, investors can support effective climate policies and help policymakers understand what makes transition investment viable. They can integrate climate risks and opportunities into investment decisions and allocate capital to commercially viable climate solutions and resilience. They can also engage companies on capital allocation, governance, disclosure, lobbying, and operational action.
Development banks have a particular role here. Through guarantees and other forms of risk-sharing, including blended finance, they can help make projects investable and mobilize private capital that would otherwise remain on the sidelines.
The role of investors is to support and reinforce the transition, rather than define or drive it. This implies a different kind of investor objective. Instead of translating decarbonization pathways into portfolio targets and then pushing every company toward theoretical alignment, investors need to identify the issues that matter to them and where they have credible opportunities to make a difference.
This shift is already visible in how some investors talk about climate goals. Instead of rigidly anchoring every action to a 1.5°C pathway, investors are considering broader Paris-aligned or directional goals that recognize the role of policy and the limits of investor control. Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), which manages Norway’s $2.3tn sovereign wealth fund, has urged the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) to recognize corporate decarbonization consistent with warming of up to 2°C, rather than insisting exclusively on 1.5°C. NBIM argues that unrealistic targets risk discouraging companies from adopting credible commitments.
For companies, investor questions are likely to increasingly focus on whether climate-related decisions are material to the business, commercially credible, and deliverable under realistic assumptions about policy, technology, and market developments.
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Capital cannot by itself make uneconomic activities investable.
Our workshop participants consistently identified engagement with companies as one of investors’ most legitimate tools. But its effectiveness depends on recognizing the commercial constraints facing boards and management. We describe this as “limitations-aware engagement.”
Investors can challenge companies to identify and pursue climate-related actions that are operationally feasible, strategically relevant, and commercially credible. They can engage with policymakers to support policy changes that expand what is commercially viable over time.
This differs from asking every company to adopt a transition pathway that policy, technology, infrastructure, or demand may not support. When investor requests move too far beyond the economics, they risk becoming performative. They may generate public pressure on companies, but they are unlikely to produce durable corporate action.
A parallel point applies to investment activity. Climate-solutions investment is most useful where capital, structuring expertise, or investor credibility changes outcomes at the margin. It is less compelling where it simply reallocates capital into already mature opportunities without affecting real-world investment or risk pricing.
For example, investor engagement on methane abatement in the oil and gas sector has high credibility: abatement has high climate impact, is relatively low cost, is operational rather than dependent on wholesale strategy change, and is increasingly measurable via satellite data. Such engagement, supported by organizations such as the Environmental Defense Fund and initiatives including the Methane Finance Working Group, helped set clearer expectations for measurement, reduction, and regulatory support. This kind of engagement fits a more realistic investor climate agenda: focused, measurable, commercially grounded, and policy-reinforcing.
Events at BP show the challenges of wholesale strategy change. BP’s 2020 transformation strategy followed investor pressure on oil and gas companies to address transition risk, including a board-supported 2019 shareholder resolution asking BP to explain how its strategy and capital expenditure were consistent with the Paris goals. That resolution did not prescribe BP’s subsequent strategy, but it reflected investor expectation that oil and gas firms should address transition risk more explicitly.
The strategy was ambitious: BP sought to shift from an international oil company model toward an integrated energy company model, with higher low-carbon investment, a large renewables capacity target, and a planned reduction in oil and gas production by 2030. But investor support for the direction of travel was not unconditional. By 2023, the context had changed: hydrocarbons were generating significant cash flow, and investors were asking harder questions about scale, pace, returns, and execution, against a backdrop of share-price underperformance. In early 2025, BP reset its strategy, placing renewed emphasis on oil and gas, reducing investment in low-carbon businesses, and divesting or restructuring parts of its renewable-energy portfolio.
Shareholder support for a company’s climate ambitions does not necessarily extend to the scale, pace, or economics of its chosen strategy. Investors may encourage climate action, but boards and management remain responsible for strategic decisions and capital allocation. Investor support depends on the strength of the business case.
How investors are redefining their climate role, and what it means for companies
Many companies have spent years developing climate disclosures, emissions targets, and transition plans. Investors will now expect them to explain clearly how climate-related risks and opportunities affect strategy, capital allocation, and financial performance.
The importance of climate will vary. It may be central to the business model, particularly in energy, utilities, or heavy industry, or material only to particular assets, markets, or activities. Companies need to explain where climate matters and what they intend to do about it.
This requires sustainability and investor relations teams to work closely with strategy and finance. The board and management need to explain the business rationale for climate-related decisions, including the assumptions and trade-offs involved.
We suggest three tests that can help boards and management assess their approach and explain it to investors.
Investors need to understand where climate change is financially and strategically relevant to a company, and where it is not. The assessment should be linked to the business model, key value drivers, strategy, and capital allocation. Physical and transition risks will affect companies differently, through their assets, costs, supply chains, customer demand, and regulatory exposure.
Materiality can change as policy, technology, customer demand, and competitive conditions evolve. Companies need to revisit their assessments rather than treating them as fixed. Companies should distinguish between climate issues that are financially material today, those that may become strategically important, and those that warrant monitoring but not significant management attention.
For some companies, managing physical climate risks and building operational resilience may be more financially material than reducing emissions.
Investor support depends on the strength of the business case.
Once a company has identified where climate matters, investors will ask what it intends to do, which alternatives it considered, and why the chosen approach makes commercial sense.
The response may be a no-regret operational improvement, such as methane reduction, an option-building investment, or a larger strategic bet. Each requires a different level of evidence. A no-regret action should have an operational or financial rationale. An option-building investment should preserve future flexibility. A strategic bet needs a convincing case for market opportunity, competitive position, and expected risk-adjusted returns.
Companies should explain how their proposed actions will protect or create value, what returns they expect, how much capital is at risk, and which assumptions depend on policy, technology, or market developments.
They also need to understand their investor base: a strategy that appeals to long-term investors seeking transition exposure may be less attractive to those focused on near-term cash flows or capital returns.
Companies should distinguish between factors within the management’s control and external dependencies and explain how these affect the timing and scale of capital commitments. Investors do not expect certainty, but they do expect management to have tested its assumptions and understood the risks.
Even a commercially sound strategy may fail if the company lacks the capabilities to execute it. Investors will look for evidence of those capabilities, alongside management accountability, clear milestones, and effective board oversight. They will also assess whether capital allocation and lobbying activity align with the company’s stated strategy.
The capabilities needed will depend on the action. Entering a low-carbon business differs from reducing operational emissions or building resilience. Investors will want to know whether the company has the necessary expertise and resources, and where delivery depends on third parties or policy.
Boards also need to ensure that strategies can adapt as circumstances change. When should changing market conditions and evidence about execution prompt a reassessment of a major strategic transformation? Companies should be clear about what would cause them to accelerate, slow, or change course.
The challenge for companies is to avoid two mistakes: making climate commitments without a credible business case and neglecting financially material climate risks.
Climate leadership requires openness about constraints, discipline in capital allocation, seriousness about resilience, and a clear view of where policy and technology matter. The task is to explain not only what the company is doing, but why it is the right response in the circumstances.
The investor climate reset should lead to a more reciprocal dialogue between investors and companies. Companies typically have deeper knowledge of their sectors, assets, customers, and operational constraints. Investors bring a capital-market perspective: whether the strategy or action offers an attractive risk-return proposition, is resilient under plausible scenarios, and supports long-term value creation.
This dialogue should focus on what is commercially viable, what could change the economics, and where companies and investors disagree. Such differences are inevitable, particularly over the pace of transition and how investors weigh company-level financial returns against longer-term, system-level climate risks. Making them explicit can reduce friction and contribute to better strategic decisions.
Investors can support and challenge corporate climate strategies, but they cannot take responsibility for them. That remains with boards and management.
Adjunct Professor of Strategic Governance and Investor Stewardship
Hans-Christoph Hirt is Adjunct Professor of Strategic Governance and Investor Stewardship at IMD, specializing in strategic governance and the role of investors in shaping long-term value creation.
Professor in Practice in the Financial Markets Group at the London School of Economics
Tom Gosling is Professor in Practice in the Financial Markets Group at the London School of Economics, where he directs the Initiative in Sustainable Finance.
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