Key principles of the twin-engine strategy
Three years into its strategy implementation, VARO can lay claim to significant progress. Once little-known, it is poised to become a $100bn company by revenues, the second largest renewable fuel producer in Europe (and one of the top five globally), and a major refiner and trader, serving over 50,000 business customers across 33 countries. This has been made possible by its 2025 acquisition of Preem, one of the largest renewable fuel producers in Scandinavia, which provides over 40% of Sweden’s and around 25% of Scandinavia’s energy needs for transportation. While this acquisition was an obvious strategic win in meeting its transformation goals, we have identified five key principles that have underpinned VARO’s success in driving its own energy transition.
1. Play where you have the ‘right to win’
Top management teams are charged with determining strategic choices and securing the “right to win” in a new space. To do so, they need to demonstrate credibility based on distinctive capabilities, capital, and passion to deliver on the proposition.
At VARO, the strategic choice was between molecules and electrons. Sanyal and his top team clarified that the company could potentially win in molecules, where they possessed end-to-end value chain expertise in conventional energy. CFO Georges Menane emphasized, “What we know how to do is the value chain – from the well to the wheel. We are good at building the various elements of the value chain so that, overall, we secure competitive advantage in the cost and the flexibility with which we bring molecules to customers.” Biofuel or biogas, for example, would require building on the existing value chain, except that the feedstock was not from the oil well but from agri-waste. The structures, processes, and tools for biofuels could be replicated from existing capabilities and know-how. This opened the door for new acquisitions, partnerships, and commercial agreements to manage the risks across a value chain that VARO was well-versed in.
The company also believed that biofuels were ideal for energy addition: it could reduce emissions by 80-90% and drop in to existing fuel usage, enabling efficient adoption from an infrastructure perspective. These aspects would be attractive for the EU as it sought to speed up the energy transition. Gilles Vollin, EVP of Integration and Capability, said, “We believe that we have the right to win with biofuels because we have the know-how in molecules, we have the infrastructure, and we know how to distribute to customers without requiring the need for change in infrastructure.”
VARO took a full value chain perspective to expand on its existing activities. For example, the company had a strong biogas trading business through a company that it acquired, RES, and a customer franchise around it. It integrated upstream capabilities by acquiring a biogas manufacturer, Bio Energy Coevorden, and investing in it to double the production capacity, establishing one of the largest biogas facilities in Europe. As the New York Times noted in its story on VARO Biogas, it was “a company of traders and engineers”. Throughout, it focused on operational efficiency to position itself as the most efficient price setter in the market.
While it is relatively straightforward for leaders to determine the strategic choices that a company should pursue, it is considerably more difficult to define what it will not do. Debates around opportunity costs, jeopardizing growth prospects, and the risk of disappointing stakeholders complicate decisions on what to forego. For VARO, distilling the discussion to the level of electrons or molecules provided strategic clarity. The leadership team acknowledged that VARO did not have the fundamental right to win with electrons and, therefore, decided not to venture into offshore wind energy production. “You don’t want to end up with a white elephant,” explained Sanyal. “The idea that you can build an unaffordable source of energy that will become affordable in the future is a conceit. A white elephant will always remain white.”
2. Find the middle path
Previously, the acceptability aspect of new energy was the lens through which decisions were made by governments, financiers, investors, and corporations to drive the energy transition. For example, oil majors started redeploying capital from fossil assets toward more “acceptable” green energy sources. However, in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, instead of acceptability, accessibility to energy security became paramount for governments. Simply put, electric jet fighters or electric tanks do not exist. Defense equipment still needs to be fueled by conventional energy. Governments were also anxious about fueling key infrastructure such as roads, marine, aviation, railways, and industrial sectors. At the core, there remained the question of the affordability of new energy sources. Europe had a unique opportunity to recalibrate and accelerate in terms of 1) framing policies to enable the desired end goal of the energy transition, 2) developing mechanisms for demand creation, permits, and incentives with faster cycle times, 3) enabling cross industry collaboration – minerals, agriculture, energy, and 4) maintaining stable regulations to create investment opportunities.
Within this acceptability-accessibility-affordability triad, VARO focused on the middle path: brownfield developments. This would enable the company to secure a license to operate from economic, social, political, and ethical perspectives. Unlike the coal transition that often left behind ghost towns, a brownfield development is built upon existing infrastructure and capabilities, extending the lifespan and livelihood of people, businesses, and towns dependent on the “old”. This aligned with government priorities by mitigating the impact on communities arising from the closure of, say, a corporate oil refinery. “From a sustainability point of view, it’s much better to adjust and repurpose an existing asset rather than abandoning it and forgetting the past,” said Menane. “Brownfield projects also typically entail lower technological and financial risks compared to completely greenfield developments.”